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I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.

I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.

That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.

I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.

That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.

No it isn't.. position and momentum are essential parts of the identity of a particle. Your consciousness is made up of particles, so your position and momentum are essential parts of your identity.

I think the fringe theory would be that two separate identical objects are somehow in any sense the same object. It's like saying two laptops that rolled off the assembly line one after the other are in fact the same laptop.

I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.

That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.

No it isn't.. position and momentum are essential parts of the identity of a particle. Your consciousness is made up of particles, so your position and momentum are essential parts of your identity.

I think the fringe theory would be that two separate objects are somehow in any sense the same object, even if they have identical compositions.

It is a fringe hypothesis. Contemporary mainstream neuroscience holds that the interactions between neurons (modeled classically) is enough to explain all relevant brain functions and any quantum processes are negligible/play no role. Assuming that to be true, an identical copy of your mind does not necessarily require identical quantum properties, because the simulation only needs to take into account classical processes.

Also, your discussion about two things not being able to have identical quantum states interests me. Could you point me to further reading?

I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.

The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.

That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.

No it isn't.. position and momentum are essential parts of the identity of a particle. Your consciousness is made up of particles, so your position and momentum are essential parts of your identity.

I think the fringe theory would be that two separate objects are somehow in any sense the same object, even if they have identical compositions.

It is a fringe hypothesis. Contemporary mainstream neuroscience holds that the interactions between neurons (modeled classically) is enough to explain all relevant brain functions and any quantum processes are negligible/play no role. Assuming that to be true, an identical copy of your mind does not necessarily require identical quantum properties, because the simulation only needs to take into account classical processes.

Also, your discussion about two things not being able to have identical quantum states interests me. Could you point me to further reading?

I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.

Classical particles have the same properties of position and momentum, so the same argument would probably be better reworded classically. Two particles that are identical in every way other than their position or momentum are not the same particle. Two consciousnesses composed of particles that are identical in every way other than their position and momentum are not the same consciousness.

https://www.quora.com/In-laymans-term-what-is-a-quantum-state

I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.

Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.

I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.

Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.

I just like the quantum view of particles.. that every particle has a distinct set of characteristics that uniquely identifies them. It reminds me of the way software works.

There is a sense in which one copy is more real than another. One of them is me, and I know it because i'm me, and the other isn't. So, one is the real me and the other isn't. Of course, the other has the same perspective, from her perspective she is the real 'me' and I am the other.. It may seem silly, but subjective experience is the most important phenomenon associated with consciousness, it's the only interesting thing about it really, so to say it will someday not matter.. I'm not so sure.

If there is an exact copy of me, it will give me exactly 0 consolation when I'm on my deathbed. Anddd, we're back.

I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.

Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.

I just like the quantum view of particles.. that every particle has a distinct set of characteristics that uniquely identifies them. It reminds me of the way software works.

There is a sense in which one copy is more real than another. One of them is me, and I know it because i'm me, and the other isn't. So, one is the real me and the other isn't. Of course, the other has the same perspective, from her perspective she is the real 'me' and I am the other.. It may seem silly, but subjective experience is the most important phenomenon associated with consciousness, it's the only interesting thing about it really, so to say it will someday not matter.. I'm not so sure.

If there is an exact copy of me, it will give me exactly 0 consolation when I'm on my deathbed. Anddd, we're back.

But when each "me" is claiming to be the real me, and both behave like me, and both exhibit consciousness, I think nobody has the right to decide which one is more real than the other. As more and more uploaded people start returning from the dead and fighting for their rights as humans and as continuations of their former selves, I expect the conversation to gradually shift toward acceptance of these people and their rights.

Even if I didn't believe that a backup copy of myself is identical to an earlier iteration of me (which I do), I'd still feel better knowing that an offshoot of my consciousness continues to live on, were I to die, than if I were to die with no backup at all.

Not really the least painful death, but in my opinion having your cells slowly deleted from existence by the burning gaze of The Great Space Eye, Zazmono, would be my ideal method of death.