But since I don't think that brain uploading is possible, I'd say a bullet to the head while being unaware of the gun. Its (hopefully) instantaneous enough so I won't realise what is happening before I die, and thus I won't get time to be afraid.
Quick question for everyone:
What is the best death in your opinion?
Best death as in "an honourable death", or as in as in "most desirable way to die"?
For the former, I'd go for the generic "die saving someone." Or many someones. Heroic sacrifices tend to be the most honourable.
For the latter, I'd agree with Tau. Brain uploading would hopefully equal a continued existence.
But since I don't think that brain uploading is possible, I'd say a bullet to the head while being unaware of the gun. Its (hopefully) instantaneous enough so I won't realise what is happening before I die, and thus I won't get time to be afraid.
Trust me when I say that putting a gun to your head is neither quick nor painless. The seconds before are some of the most agonizing and long seconds in your life.
True. But for me I think that the best death would be to be high on drugs and jump off a tall building. Might be fun before I hit the ground.Alternatively you could "miraculously" survive with permanent, constantly excruciating physical pain and severe brain damage.
Then make it a very high building.
But I imagine it's not as direct and effective as going into your brain's code and modifying it. :))
Then make it a very high building.
People survive skydiving accidents.
Like our current anti-malware?
Yeah, at some point you reach terminal velocity and stop speeding up...Then make it a very high building.
People survive skydiving accidents.
Yeah, I think any good brain uploading system should have multiple and regularly scheduled backups in different, secure locations, as well as at least some level of separation between individuals and the outside world.Like our current anti-malware?
Not at all. If we can upload consciousnesses, I imagine we'll have much better anti-malware. Besides, you can like, shoot people in the head and stab people and what not when they aren't uploaded, it's not like you'll only be getting additional risks.
You also don't need to like upload into a cloud or something like that, why not an air-gapped machine? Then you can choose to communicate by sending letters in the mail or something or making phone calls.
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I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.
That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.
The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.
That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.
The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.
It is a fringe hypothesis. Contemporary mainstream neuroscience holds that the interactions between neurons (modeled classically) is enough to explain all relevant brain functions and any quantum processes are negligible/play no role. Assuming that to be true, an identical copy of your mind does not necessarily require identical quantum properties, because the simulation only needs to take into account classical processes.That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.
The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.
No it isn't.. position and momentum are essential parts of the identity of a particle. Your consciousness is made up of particles, so your position and momentum are essential parts of your identity.
I think the fringe theory would be that two separate objects are somehow in any sense the same object, even if they have identical compositions.
It is a fringe hypothesis. Contemporary mainstream neuroscience holds that the interactions between neurons (modeled classically) is enough to explain all relevant brain functions and any quantum processes are negligible/play no role. Assuming that to be true, an identical copy of your mind does not necessarily require identical quantum properties, because the simulation only needs to take into account classical processes.That's merely a fringe hypothesis that has little experimental support so far. I'm inclined to disbelieve it unless we gain further, more conclusive evidence.I don't see why an identical simulation of myself would be any less "me" than I am. If from the outside, two things are completely indistinguishable, I have no reason to believe that they are different. For me, at least, direct continuity of consciousness isn't necessary for continuation of life.
The particles that make up your consciousness have a quantum state, a part of which is their position in space. This is responsible for the context that is your consciousness, an identical clone of you that does not occupy the same space as you is not you. When you die, they will live and you will be dust.
No it isn't.. position and momentum are essential parts of the identity of a particle. Your consciousness is made up of particles, so your position and momentum are essential parts of your identity.
I think the fringe theory would be that two separate objects are somehow in any sense the same object, even if they have identical compositions.
Also, your discussion about two things not being able to have identical quantum states interests me. Could you point me to further reading?
I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.
I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.
But when each "me" is claiming to be the real me, and both behave like me, and both exhibit consciousness, I think nobody has the right to decide which one is more real than the other. As more and more uploaded people start returning from the dead and fighting for their rights as humans and as continuations of their former selves, I expect the conversation to gradually shift toward acceptance of these people and their rights.I'm not saying, and never implied, that the more esoteric quantum effects are making themselves known in the brain, only that two separate identical brains are still different brains. The consciousness lives in the brain, so if there are two identical brains, there are two separate objects and two separate consciousnesses. Thus, there would be two identical yous, but only one of them would actually be the you that you currently are. One could die, and it would in no sense remain alive just because the other didn't also die.Ah, I seem to have misunderstood you (probably because, in my head, your elaboration using quantum states was irrelevant). What I'm trying to say is that the fact that the consciousnesses are separate should not matter. When you have two identical "yous," neither of them should be more "real" just because it has the advantage of some more direct continuity. If mind uploading is destructive, you may have "died" by some definitions, but the concept of death itself by necessity must change once being able to restore from a backup becomes possible.
I just like the quantum view of particles.. that every particle has a distinct set of characteristics that uniquely identifies them. It reminds me of the way software works.
There is a sense in which one copy is more real than another. One of them is me, and I know it because i'm me, and the other isn't. So, one is the real me and the other isn't. Of course, the other has the same perspective, from her perspective she is the real 'me' and I am the other.. It may seem silly, but subjective experience is the most important phenomenon associated with consciousness, it's the only interesting thing about it really, so to say it will someday not matter.. I'm not so sure.
If there is an exact copy of me, it will give me exactly 0 consolation when I'm on my deathbed. Anddd, we're back.